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1 Abstract
Payment Channel Networks or PCNs have gained prominence ensuring faster relaying of transactions.
However, this Layer-two solution has its own fair share of problems. Topological analysis on Lightning
Network reveals that Griefing Attack is a major problem whereby an adversary intentionally exhausts
the channel capacity of the network. It can be used for mounting series of targeted attacks like Denial-
of-Service Attack, Node Isolation Attack and Channel Exhaustion Attack on honest participants as
well. Though the attack does not always result in a direct monetary gain of the attacker, blocking
of channel capacity for several days prevented several nodes from processing any future transaction
request, leading to substantial collateral damage. Certain portions of the payment channel network
get stalled which hampers the throughput and utility of the network. Mitigating Griefing Attack still
remains an open problem.
In this paper, we propose an efficient countermeasure for the attack, known as Griefing-Penalty.
Mounting such an attack requires the attacker to pay a penalty proportional to the collateral cost of
executing a payment. The penalty is used for compensating parties who incurred loss by locking funds.
Our proposed strategy works for any timelock based payment protocol and ensures faster resolution
of payments. To illustrate it, we propose a new payment protocol HTLC-GP or Hashed Timelock
Contract with Griefing-Penalty. It not only preserves privacy but also ensures that an attacker cannot
ascribe blame on any honest intermediary present in the path relaying a payment.
2 Introduction
Since the inception of Bitcoin [1] in 2009, blockchain technology has seen widespread adoption in
the payment space. Many blockchain-based payment solutions have been defined but Bitcoin and
∗Authors are listed in alphabetical order, Email: mail.prabal@gmail.com‡, subhra.mazumdar1993@gmail.com‡,
Sushmita.Ruj@data61.csiro.au#.
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Ethereum [2] remain the top two platforms in terms of market capitalization with a combined cap of
185 Billion USD [3]. Despite many desired features like decentralization and pseudonymity, a constant
criticism faced by Bitcoin and Ethereum is that of scalability.
Several works have proposed protocol level changes in Layer-one to increase scalability like sharding
[4], [5], alternate consensus architecture [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], side-chains [12]. These changes are
hard to implement as they need consensus from the community, revamping the trust assumptions of
the base layer and changing the codebase. Recent works have tried to come up with solutions in
Layer-two [13]. It massively cuts down data processing on the blockchain by running computations
off-chain. The amount of data storage on Layer-one is minimized. Taking transactions off the base
layer, while still anchored to it, would free up processing resources to do other things. Also Layer-two
relies on Layer-one for security.
Though several solutions like [14], [15], [4] have been proposed, Payment Channel [15] stood out
as a practically deployable answer to the scalability issue. It is modular in nature, without requiring
any fundamental changes in the protocol layer. Any two parties with some deposit made in the
Blockchain network can mutually open a payment channel by locking their funds for a certain time-
period. The funds locked in the channel enable several off-chain payments to be carried out between
these two parties, by locally agreeing on the new deposit balance. Except for opening and closing of
the payment channel, none of the transaction gets recorded on-chain. In case of dispute, any party
can unilaterally broadcast the latest valid transaction in the blockchain and terminate the channel. A
malicious party will lose all the fund locked in the channel if he or she tries to broadcast any older
transaction. Since opening a payment channel has its overhead in terms of time and amount of funds
locked, parties that are not connected directly leverage on the set of existing payment channels for
transfer of funds. This set of payment channels form the Payment Channel Network or PCN [16]. It
is modeled as a bidirectional weighted graph where nodes are entities who can issue payments to other
participants in the network by using channels, also the termed as the edges of the PCN.
Griefing Attack. Given a PCN, consider a payment α has to be made via n payment channels,
where n ∈ N, n > 1. Let us index each channel by i where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The channel connected
directly to the payer is indexed 1 and channel ending with payee is indexed n. For executing the
payment, an amount α is locked in each of the payment channel i for a period of (n− i+ 1)∆, which
is also termed as locktime. ∆ > 0 is the worst-case confirmation time when the transaction is settled
on-chain. Once the amount gets locked, it cannot be utilized before the elapse of the locktime. If an
adversary controlling channel j, where j ∈ [1, n], refuses to resolve the contract off-chain and raises
a dispute, then the time taken to resolve it will be (n − j + 1)∆. It manages to lock jα coins in the
payment channels preceding it just by locking α coins in channel (j+1). If the adversary is controlling
the receiver then without incurring any cost for mounting the attack, it locks (n−1)α for a time period
of ∆. If an adversary manages to capture any node present in the middle of the path, then the attack
results in worst-case collateral damage. The amount of fund locked is approximately n2α for a time
period of O(n∆), thus total loss incurred is O(n2∆α).
A RB C D
off-chain contract
timeout: 4 days
R ignores off-chain
contract request, from D
off-chain contract
timeout: 3 days
off-chain contract
timeout: 2 days
off-chain contract
timeout: 1 day
Figure 1: Griefing Attack: when node R ignores HTLC request
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A RB C D
R ignores off-chain
request from D
A's fund stuck
for 1 entire day
B's fund stuck for 
1 entire day
C's fund stuck for 
1 entire day
D's fund stuck for 
1 entire day
Figure 2: Funds locked in the path for 1 day
Example 1 A wants to transfer fund to a node R. It leverages on the existing payment channels AB,
BC, CD and DR for relaying funds from A to R, as shown in Fig.1. A locks fund with B for a period
of 4 days, B locks its fund with C for a period of 3 days, C locks funds with D for a period of 2 days
and ultimately D locks fund with R for 1 day. R ignores the request and refrains from releasing the
payment condition, as shown in Fig.2. The payment fails with D rolling back to its previous state after
one day. D terminates its off-chain contract with C, C cancels its contract with B, B and A following
suit as well. Hence R manages to lock 1 unit coin in each payment channel for one entire day. None
of the channel can utilize the amount before the locktime of channel DR elapses.
griefs for 24 hrs
griefs for 24 hrs
channel
capacity
blocked for 24
hrs
channel
capacity
blocked for 24
hrs
channel
capacity
blocked for 24
hrs
channel
capacity
blocked for 24
hrs channel
capacity
blocked for 24
hrs
Figure 3: Sybil nodes carry out payment
Motivation of Griefing Attack. An adversary, controlling both the sender and receiver, submits
a high-valued payment request in the network with the intention of locking liquidity of intermediate
channels. Neither the sender nor the receiver gains economically but it successfully reduces the net-
work throughput. It may setup several sybil nodes at strategic positions and amplify the damage by
submitting several payment requests. A substantial part of the network gets blocked for a considerable
amount of time. In absence of the attack, any affected participants of the network could have earned
sufficient remuneration by accepting several transaction requests within that duration.
An adversary may try to eliminate its competitor in the business of forwarding payments. It
strategically mounts channel exhaustion attack upon its competitor by carrying out self-payment of
value equivalent to the liquidity of its outgoing payment channels. The adversary sets the victim as an
intermediate node in the path carrying out the self-payment. The victim cannot utilize the fund till
the adversary decide to claim the payment. As a consequence, several future payment request which
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could have been routed through the victim node now gets routed through the adversary. It reaps
indirect economic benefit by claiming the processing fee for routing such transactions.
Any rational intermediate node might not be motivated to carry out griefing attack as it would lose
out on earning fee from processing the transaction, as stated in [17]. However, if the attacker is able
to capture some hub nodes then definitely it will try to route large number of transactions through it
in order to maximize the damage.
In this paper, we consider these three main motivations for mounting a Griefing Attack:
• Stalling network using self payment or by using sybil nodes: The adversary controls the sender
and receiver of several payment requests, blocking multiple intermediaries from accepting any
other payments to be routed through it [18], [17], as shown in Fig. 3.
A B
M
C
D
0.05 BTC 0.05 BTC
0.05 BTC
0.05 BTC0.05 BTC
0.05 BTC
0.05 BTC 0.05 BTC
Figure 4: Eliminating a competitor
• Eliminating a competitor from the network: The adversary tries to eliminate a competitor and
block all its existing channel’s outgoing capacity [19], [17]. It carries out self payment of value
equivalent to the victim’s outgoing channel capacity, jamming all the channels of the victim node.
In Fig. 4, Node B has outgoing channel with A and C, each of capacity 0.1 BTC. Node D has
channel with A and C, each of capacity 0.2 BTC. It conducts self-payment of 0.05 BTC, in each
direction. Upon griefing for 24 hrs, D denies B from accepting any transaction request. A and
C, having residual outgoing capacity of 0.1 BTC each in channel AD and CD, is now forced to
route all the payments via D.
• Stalling network using intermediary: The adversary controls a node with high degree centrality
and broadcasts its processing fee to be extremely low in order to ensure multiple payments get
routed through the such nodes [20]. It later ignores all the payment by not forwarding the
message to outgoing neighbours, locking funds across multiple paths thereby affecting a large
portion of the network. Fig. 5 demonstrates a DoS attack by hub node. It charges a very low
processing fee compared to other hub node (here it is E). It ignores all payment request and
stalls the network.
2.1 Overview of Griefing-Penalty
Griefing Attack in Bitcoin-compatible PCNs cannot be prevented as long as malicious node has nothing
to lose or in other words, it has nothing at stake. This problem can be answered if we penalize the
attacker, also termed as griefer, for ignoring the incoming off-chain contract request. This penalty is
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Processing fee
lower than node E
E
Stops forwarding payment
request
Figure 5: DoS attack by a hub node
termed as Griefing-Penalty 1. Not only does it have to pay compensation for locking the fund of its
channel’s counterparty but it has to compensate other parties which got affected by the attack.
The griefing-penalty imposed on an adversary for mounting griefing attack on a path of length
n is proportional to the summation of collateral cost of each payment channel involved in routing.
Collateral cost per payment channel is defined as the product of the amount locked in the off-chain
contract and the expiration time of the contract. The reason behind considering the expiration time
of the contract for accounting of griefing-penalty is to punish griefer for denying service to other
participants in the path. The money remaining locked in the channels could have been utilised by the
intermediaries for earning processing fee by processing several other payment requests. Thus, we force
any party accepting incoming off-chain contract request to invest a substantial amount of liquidity.
This will definitely disincentivize an adversary from mounting the attack due to the cost involved.
Alice Dave Charlie Bob
Figure 6: Formation of contract under Griefing-Penalty
Let us demonstrate it through an example, shown in Fig.6. Alice wants to transfer p units to Bob
via payment channels (Alice-Dave, Dave-Charlie, Charlie-Bob). Alice forms an off-chain contract with
Dave locking p units for a time period of t days. Given that the rate of griefing-penalty is q units
1In payment channel, penalty refers to claiming of the entire fund locked in the channel by an affected party if its
counterparty misbehaves by broadcasting an older transaction. Hence to distinguish the two concepts, we use the term
Griefing-Penalty where a party has to incur loss for capturing channel fund.
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per day, q being a fraction, Dave is expected to lock qpt units of fund as griefing-penalty with the
off-chain contract. Dave has to transfer p units to Charlie, it forms a similar off-chain contract for a
time period of (t− 1) days. The griefing-penalty for the channel (Dave-Charlie) is qp(t− 1). However,
upon griefing, Charlie is expected to pay compensation to both Dave and Alice. Hence it has to pay a
cumulative griefing-penalty qpt+ qp(t− 1). The total money locked in the off-chain contract between
Dave and Charlie is p + qpt + qp(t − 1). Charlie transfers p units to Bob by forming an off-chain
contract for locktime of (t − 2) days, with both parties locking p + qpt + qp(t − 1) + qp(t − 2) units
of funds. qpt + qp(t − 1) + qp(t − 2) units is the cumulative penalty to be distributed among Alice,
Dave and Charlie, if Bob refuses to resolve the payment before expiration of locktime. Suppose Bob
griefs and refuses to resolve the payment, waiting for (t − 2) days to elapse. He will have to transfer
qpt+ qp(t− 1) + qp(t− 2) units of funds to Charlie, as per the terms of the contract. Charlie unlocks
p units of funds after the contract expires and withdraws qp(t − 2) units from the compensation it
receives. He forwards qpt+ qp(t− 1) to Dave. Dave withdraws qp(t− 1) and forwards the rest of the
amount to Alice. Note that except Bob, none of the parties lose funds in order to compensate any of
the affected parties.
2.1.1 Reverse-Griefing
As a consequence of griefing-penalty, a malicious party can now ascribe the blame of griefing on an
honest party as well. Consider a timelocked contract exist between party A and B, where A will forward
payment to B provided it satisfies the terms of the contract within a given time-period. Failure to
provide a witness for resolving the payment within the given timeout period results in B paying a pre-
determined penalty to A. If B is honest and due to some unforeseen circumstances, it cannot satisfy
the terms of the contract then it will immediately request A to terminate the contract by mutual
agreement. However, A takes advantage of the situation and ignores the request for termination. It
knows that B has no way to resolve the contract on-chain as it lacks the witness. After the locktime
elapses, A broadcasts its transaction claiming the full griefing-penalty from B. Though B was not
involved in griefing, still it ends up losing a considerable amount of fund.
2.1.2 A different strategy for mounting Griefing-attack
Leveraging on reverse-griefing, an adversary can mount griefing-attack without paying any penalty.
It may simply refuse to sign an incoming off-chain contract or maliciously terminate the contract
by sending an error message. If there exist a node in the path, in close proximity to the adversary,
which is either greedy or finds that money earned by reverse-griefing is higher than the profit it will
make by processing future transaction requests, then there is a high probability that this node will
act as a griefer. Even better, if the adversary manages to corrupt another node in the path then
the attack will definitely get mounted. We illustrate the strategy via Fig. 7. Node preceding E and
the node succeeding E in the path are controlled by the same adversary. Let us denote it as F and
D respectively. F refuses to sign the off-chain contract request by E. E requests D to cancel the
contract and form a new commitment transaction. D refuses to terminate the contract and waits till
the locktime of the contract elapses. E becomes a victim of reverse-griefing and ends up paying a
cumulative penalty for nodes A,B,C and D. D on the other hand, manages to lock funds in the path
from A to D for the next 2 days. Hence, we see in this situation, not only did the adversary manage
to lock funds in the path but earned a profit by ascribing the blame on an honest node.
To avoid such situation, we make certain assumptions in our System Model and Adversarial Model,
as stated in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. Based on it, we argue that reverse-griefing is not a good
6
A B C D E F
A locks
money for 5
days
B locks
money for 4
days
C locks
money for 3
days
D locks
money for 2
days
F does not sign
the contract send
by E
A B C E
E request cancellation of
contract, F ignores and
waits for expiry of locktime
A B C E
E pays penalty to A,B,C
and D after 2 days
elapse
Money locked in off-chain contract established in channels AB, BC and CD for the next 2 days
Figure 7: D and F are malicious, D reverse-griefs, E is victimized
strategy for earning money, hence any rational player would choose to follow the protocol instead of
keeping its funds locked.
2.2 Our Contributions
• We propose a countermeasure for mitigating griefing attack in Bitcoin-compatible PCNs, known
as Griefing-Penalty. It punishes the griefer by forcing it to pay compensation to all the parties
whose funds got locked for a certain time-period as a result of the attack.
• The loss of funds incurred upon mounting griefing-attack is proportional to the collateral cost of
each channel involved in routing the payment.
• To illustrate the benefit of the proposed countermeasure, we propose a new payment protocol,
called as HTLC-GP or Hashed Timelock Contract with Griefing-Penalty.
• We provide a security analysis which proves that our protocol is privacy preserving as well as
mitigates loss due to griefing attack by compensating the honest nodes.
3 Background
3.1 Payment Channel Network
A Payment Channel Network (PCN) [21] is defined as a bidirected graph G := (V,E), where V is the
set of accounts dealing with cryptocurrency and E is the set of payment channels opened between a
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Table 1: Notations used in the paper
Notation Description
G(V,E) Payment Channel Network, E represents the set of payment channels
S Payer/Sender, S ∈ V
R Payee/Receiver, R ∈ V
α Amount to be transferred from S to R
P Path connecting S to R
n Length of the path P
Ui ∈ V, i ∈ [0, n] Nodes in P,U0 = S,Un = R, (Ui, Ui+1) ∈ E
locked(Ui, Uj) Amount of funds locked by Ui in the payment channel (Ui, Uj)
remain(Ui, Uj) Net balance of Ui that can be transferred to Uj via off-chain transaction
fee(Ui) Processing fee charged by Ui for forwarding the payment
λ Security Parameter
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ A standard one-way function
∆ Worst-case confirmation time when a transaction is settled on-chain
γ Rate of griefing penalty (per minute)
pair of accounts. A PCN is defined with respect to a blockchain. Apart from the opening and closing
of the payment channel, none of the transaction gets recorded on the blockchain. Upon closing the
channel, cryptocurrency gets deposited into each user’s wallet according to the most recent balance
in the payment channel. Every node v ∈ V charge a processing fee fee(v), for relaying funds across
the network. Correctness of payment across each channel is enforced cryptographically by hash-
based scripts [16], scriptless locking [22]. Each payment channel (vi, vj) has an associated capacity
locked(vi, vj), denoting the amount locked by vi and locked(vj , vi) denoting the amount locked by vj .
remain(vi, vj) signifies the residual amount of coins vi can transfer to vj . Suppose that a node s, also
denoted by v0, wants to transfer amount α to node r through a path v0 → v1 → v2 . . .→ vn → r, with
each node vi charging a processing fee fee(vi). If remain(vi, vi+1) ≥ αi : αi = α − Σnk=ifee(vk), i ∈
[0, n− 1], then funds can be relayed across the channel (vi, vi+1). The residual capacity is updated as
follows : remain(vi, vi+1) = remain(vi, vi+1)− αi and remain(vi+1, vi) = remain(vi+1, vi) + αi.
3.2 Hashed Time-lock Contract
Hashed Time-lock Contract (HTLC) [16], [21] is a payment protocol which allows secure transfers of
funds from payer S to payeeR, using a network of channels across an n-hop route (u0, u1, u2, . . . , un), S =
u0, R = un. The payee R creates a condition y defined by y = H(x˜) where x˜ is a random string andH is
a random oracle [23]. The condition y is shared with S. It now shares the condition with u1, u2, . . . , un
for construction of the HTLC. Between any pair of adjacent nodes (ui, ui+1), the hashed time-lock
contract is defined by HTLC(ui, ui+1, y, b, t) - implies that this contract locks b units of fund of party
ui that can be released to party ui+1 only if it releases the correct preimage x˜ for which y = H(x˜)
within timeout t. If ui+1 doesn’t release x˜ within time t, then ui settles the dispute on-chain by
broadcasting the transaction which rolls back b amount to its wallet. If ui+1 wants to terminate its
HTLC off-chain with ui then the HTLC is invalidated by creating a new commitment transaction with
the updated balance of ui and ui+1. This HTLC is then set at each payment channel present on the
path to the receiver.
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The payment gets resolved quickly if all the participants collaborate. However, if receiver or any
other intermediate node ignores the incoming contract request and wait for the expiration of the off-
chain contract, the funds remain locked in the path. Note that after the timeout period, all the parties
withdraw the fund locked in the contract. The griefer doesn’t lose any money in the process.
4 Problem Statement & System Overview
4.1 Problem Definition
Problem 1 Given a payment channel network defined by G(V,E), where V is the nodes with deposit
in the Bitcoin network and E ⊆ V × V defines the payment channels. A payment of amount α0 =
α + Σn−1i=1 fee(Ui) has to be made from payer U0 to payee Un via the path P = 〈U0, U1, . . . , Un〉 via
payment channels (Ui, Ui+1),∀i ∈ [0, n − 1], Ui ∈ V, (Ui, Ui+1) ∈ E. Each intermediate node charge
a processing fee, denoted as fee(Ui). Assuming that the path has enough capacity for routing the
payment, each party Ui establish an off-chain contract with Ui+1 and locks αi = α0 − Σij=0fee(Uj),
fee(U0) = 0, in the contract for a time-period of (n− i)∆. If Ui+1 intentionally withholds the solution
without resolving the incoming off-chain contract, then Ui waits for the timelock to expire, after which
funds can be withdrawn from the contract. Note that rest of the parties Uj , 0 ≤ j < i waits for the same
time-period, keeping their funds locked in their respective off-chain contract. This is known as Griefing
Attack. The attack stalls a part of the network for a considerable time period, where an adversary
temporarily claim channel capacity. Our objective is to design a strategy whereby the griefer incurs
substantial loss for ignoring request for resolving the off-chain timelocked contracts.
4.2 System Model
The topology of the payment channel network is known by any node in the network since opening or
closing of a payment channel is recorded on the blockchain. Pairs of honest users, sharing a payment
channel, communicate through secure and authenticated channels. An honest party willing to send
funds to another party, will adhere to the protocol. It will not tamper with the terms and conditions
of off-chain contract meant for each of the intermediate payment channels, involved in relaying the
payment. The model of communication is considered to be synchronous, with all the parties following
a global clock for settling payments off-chain.
We assume that for a given node, individual griefing-penalty earned upon elapse of locktime of the
off-chain contract is less than the expected revenue earned by processing several transaction request
within the given locktime. We assume that all the nodes in the network are rational, whose intention
is to maximize the earning by remaining active in the network. Hence any such rational player would
prefer to utilize their funds rather than earn penalty by reverse-griefing and keep their funds locked in
a channel.
4.3 Adversarial Model & Assumptions
An adversary introduces multiple sybil nodes and places them strategically (targeting the hub nodes)
in the network in order to maximize the collateral damage. Such sybil nodes may be involved in self
payment or transfer funds from one sybil node to the other for mounting griefing attack. For ease of
analysis, we assume that at most one node present in the path relaying a payment request is controlled
by the adversary. Our assumption is based on the observation made in [18], [20]. In order to reduce the
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cost of the attack, the optimal choice is corrupting one node per payment or an adversary executing
a self-payment.
An adversary can perform the following arbitrary actions in order to keep funds locked in the
network for substantial amount of time:
• Withholding the solution and not resolving the incoming off-chain payment request.
• Refrain from forwarding the off-chain payment request to the next neighbour.
• Reverse-grief by ignoring request for termination of contract.
• Refuse to sign any incoming contract request.
• Terminate the contract citing lack of witness or error in parameters.
An adversary would perform such actions provided it is able to achieve at least one of the motivation,
stated in Section 2. If none of the objective is satisfied, then it would prefer to follow the protocol and
utilize the funds in order to avoid payment of griefing-penalty. The idea behind such an assumption
is by mounting a Griefing Attack the adversary gains a tacit revenue. Unless it is able to successfully
mount the attack, it would rather be rational and earn like honest nodes than have its fund locked up
in a failed attempt.
We have discussed in details the consequences of griefing attack by multiple parties in a single path
in Section 6.3.
4.4 System Goals
• Guaranteed compensation for an honest node: All the parties affected by the griefing
attack will be remunerated by the griefer. Except the griefer, no one must lose fund in order to
pay compensation to any of the affected parties.
• Privacy: None of the intermediate nodes involved in routing a payment must be able to identify
its exact position in the path as well as figure out the identity of sender and receiver of payment.
5 Generic Solution for countering Griefing Attack
Designing fair protocols on Bitcoin, where the adversary was forced to pay a mutually predefined
monetary penalty to compensate the loss of honest parties, was first introduced in Bentov et al. [24].
They used a claim-or-refund functionality where the sender deposits money which is later transferred
to the receiver contingent on whether the receiver acts honestly or not. In the two party case, the
functionality allows a sender S to send p coins to receiver R if R provides a witness that satisfies
some mutually agreed precondition within a predefined time period. To achieve the same, both parties
deposit some coins at the start of the protocol. Then R releases the witness which the functionality
checks for correctness. If correct, the receiver claims its due share of coins along with its deposit.
Otherwise, the sender gets a penalty to compensate for its loss which is funded by the receiver’s
deposit.
In our multiparty model, U0 intends to transfer payment of amount α to Un via multiple inter-
mediaries Uj , j ∈ [1, n − 1]. A party Ui forms an off-chain contract with Ui+1 using a pre-defined
commitment. Both the parties lock money in the contract, with Ui depositing the amount that has
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to be transferred to Ui+1 contingent to the knowledge of decommitment within a certain time-period
ti > (n− i)∆, i ∈ [0, n− 1]. The latter, on the other hand, locks a certain amount as penalty. It can
be claimed by Ui after elapse of ti, if Ui+1 doesn’t respond. The terms of the off-chain contract is
replicated across all payment channels involved in routing the payment from U0 to Un. If a node defers
from rendering service, it will pay a price for its irrational behavior. The amount charged as penalty
by a node Ui is directly proportional to the loss it incurs in terms of collateral cost, i.e. α(n − i)∆.
Inspired from this idea, we propose a countermeasure for griefing attack, Griefing-Penalty, to solve
the problem of griefing in Bitcoin-compatible PCN, as defined in Section 4.1. We consider a generic
two-party off-chain timelocked contract and illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy in
countering griefing attack.
5.1 Two-party Off-Chain Timelocked Contract with Griefing-Penalty
Consider a timelocked contract TLCgp established between two parties. The terms of the contract are
enforceable via blockchain. If a party X wants to transfer x amount to party Y and rate of penalty
is γ per minute, then party X will establish an off-chain contract with Y, with a contract resolution
time of t days. X will lock amount x and party Y will lock γ ∗ x ∗ t ∗ 60 with the off-chain contract.
For example, consider two parties Alice and Bob with a payment channel in between them, each
having locked a fund of 5 msat. Suppose Alice wants to transfer 1 msat to Bob, it establishes the
contract with f(x) as the commitment and a locktime of 3 days. Both the parties have to agree to the
following terms of the contract, with rate of penalty being 0.001 per minute:
• Alice expects a prompt reply from Bob. If Bob does not respond within 3 days, he will bear
a penalty of 0.001*24*60*3*1= 4.32 msat. Hence Alice locks 1 msat and Bob has to lock 4.32
msat with the contract. Hence total amount locked in contract is 5.32 msat.
• If Bob can produce to Alice an unknown random input data x within 3 days, then Alice will
settle the contract with Bob unlocking 5.32 msat.
• If 3 days have elapsed and Bob has not been able to produce x, then he loses 5.32 msat to Alice.
Alice gets back 5.32 msat.
• Either party may (and should) pay out according to the terms of this contract in any method of
the participants choosing and close out this contract early so long as both participants in this
contract agree.
• Any violation of the above terms incurs a maximum griefing-penalty equal to the funds locked
up in this contract.
6 Hashed Timelock Contract with Griefing-Penalty (HTLC-
GP)
We propose a new payment protocol for Bitcoin-compatible PCNs by incorporating Griefing-Penalty
into HTLC [16]. The function f as defined as collision-resistant Hash function H. Consider the
previous instance of a channel between Alice and Bob, where Alice has established an HTLC-GP with
Bob for transferring 1 msat. Rate of griefing-penalty being 0.001 per minute. The terms of the contract
is as follows: Given H = H(x) in the contract, Bob can claim fund of 1 msat from Alice contingent
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to the knowledge of x, within a time-period of 3 days. If Bob fails to do so, then after a timeout of 3
days, it pays a penalty of 4.32 msat to Alice.
Construction of two-party off-chain Revocable HTLC-GP
The establishment of two-party HTLC-GP between Alice and Bob has been illustrated in Fig. 8, the
structure being similar to construction of Off-Chain Revocable HTLC [16]. Both parties have locked
funds of 5 msat each, which gets included as the Funding Transaction. Alice intends to transfer 1 msat
to Bob, using the same conditions as explained in Section 5.1. Bob locks 4.32 msat and Alice locks 1
msat into HTLC-GP. Bob can withdraw the entire amount contingent to the knowledge of preimage
corresponding to the payment hash. If Bob fails to respond, upon expiration of locktime Alice claims
the entire amount. Thus both the parties mutually agree to form second commitment transaction
(CT1a/CT1b). Output 2 of CT1a describes how funds get locked in HTLC-GP. 5.32 msat will be
encumbered in an HTLC-GP. If a party wants to unilaterally close the channel then it broadcasts
latest Commitment Transaction. The parties are remunerated as per terms of the contract. If CT1a
is broadcasted and Bob has produced R within 3 days, it can immediately claim the fund of 5.32 msat
by broadcasting HTLC-GP Execution Delivery 1a. Revocable Sequence Maturity Contract (RSMC)
embedding [16] used in the output HTLC-GP Timeout Delivery 1a ensures that if Alice broadcasts
this transaction, it has to wait for 1000 block confirmation time before it can spend 5.32 msat. This
extra waiting time serves as a buffer time for resolving dispute. If Alice had made a false claim of
CT1a being the latest state of the channel, Bob will raise a dispute and spend Alice’s channel deposit.
The same state of channel is replicated in CT1b. However, the difference lies in how each party
can spend their respective output with respect to the copy of the transaction they have. If CT1b is
broadcasted and Bob has not been able to produce R within a period of 3 days, then it can claim fund
of 5.32 msat after 3 days by broadcasting HTLC-GP Timeout delivery 1b. If Bob has the preimage R,
it can immediately broadcast HTLC-GP Execution Delivery 1b. However this output is encumbered
by 1000 block confirmation time, the explanation being the same as we had stated for HTLC-GP
Timeout Delivery 1a. These changes can be easily integrated into the Bitcoin script.
6.1 Our Proposed Construction
For secure transfers of funds from U0 to Un, the former selects an optimal route for transferring funds
to the payee, as per its routing strategy. Let the path be P = 〈U0, U1, . . . , Un〉 via which payer U0
will relay fund of value α to payee Un. Each party Ui, i ∈ [1, n − 1] charge a service fee of fee(Ui)
for relaying the fund. Hence the total amount that U0 needs to transfer is α˜ = α+ Σ
n−1
i=1 fee(Ui). We
denote each αi = α˜−Σij=1fee(Uj), i ∈ [1, n− 1],α0 = α˜ and αn−1 = α. Each node Ui samples pair of
secret key and public key (ski, pki).
Possibility of Reverse-Griefing in HTLC-GP and its Countermeasure. In Bitcoin Light-
ning Network [16], onion routing is used for propagating the terms of HTLC. An HMAC provided with
the data allowed the forwarding node to check integrity of data. Since we introduce griefing-penalty,
a malicious forwarding node might try to cheat by changing the terms of the off-chain contract it ex-
tends to an honest party. The honest party, upon finding discrepancy, reports failure to the malicious
party. If the malicious party refrains from canceling the contract, the honest party becomes a victim
of reverse-griefing and ends up paying the full compensation. To prevent an honest node from losing
funds, it will do a one step look-ahead whereby terms of the outgoing contracts will be checked before
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Figure 8: Revocable HTLC-GP
committing to the terms of incoming off-chain contract. In case of any discrepancy, it denies accepting
the incoming contract and sends a failure message.
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Parameters used
• Rate of Griefing-penalty: The griefing-penalty rate γ per minute decides the amount to be
deducted as compensation from the balance of a node responsible for griefing. Usually, γ lies
between 0 and 1. It is set as a global parameter.
• Routing Attempt Cost ψ: U0 has to figure out the path by probing channels which will be able to
route the transaction. This may require several attempts and hence adds an extra computational
as well as resource overhead on U0. In the event of griefing, U0 adds the cost of routing attempt
to the compensation withdrawn from griefer. Additionally, introduction of the routing attempt
fee to the cumulative penalty preserves sender privacy, as discussed in Theorem 2. This is a
variable quantity and the quantity is kept hidden from other nodes but generally a sender sets
the value ψt0 ≥ α((k + 1)t0 + Σkl=1l∆), k ∈ N and preferably k > 3.
U0 shares φ(n) with Un, where φ is a function used for blinding the exact value of n, φ(n).αtn−1 ≈
((ψ + α0)t0 + Σ
n−1
j=1αjtj), adding the extra cost for routing to the compensation it must claim from
U1. Since U0 is the source, the maximum penalty it must claim from U1 is γ.α˜t0, t0 > n∆ + tnow. But
seeing the griefing-penalty value, U1 can infer that the incoming off-chain contract has been sent out
by the source of the payment. Even other nodes can figure out their position in the path with the
information of cumulative griefin-penalty. Hence U0 adds the routing attempt cost along with the flow
it sends to U1. The latter cannot infer whether ψ is routing attempt fee or the cumulative flow from
any predecessors of U0.
The maximum compensation, which can be earned by Ui, i ∈ [1, n − 1] is γ.αiti, where αi is
the amount to be transferred to Ui+1, if contract is resolved successfully within ti. If Ui+1 is at
fault, then it has to pay compensation to all the parties which got affected starting from Ui till U0.
Hence compensation charged by each channel (Uk, Uk+1), k ∈ [0, i], must be withdrawn from the faulty
node Ui+1. The total griefing-penalty to be paid is γ.(Σ
i
j=1(αjtj) + (α0 + ψ)t0), so that each party
Um,m ∈ [1, i] gets a compensation of γ.αmtm and U0 withdraws a compensation of γ(ψ + α˜)t0.
Our protocol involves three phases - Pre-processing Phase, Locking Phase and Release Phase.
We discuss each phase in details:
• Pre-processing Phase: U0 uses onion routing for propagating the information needed by each
node Ui, i ∈ [1, n−1] to construct off-chain contract with Ui+1, across the path P . It sends M0 =
E(. . . E(E(Zn−1, pkn−1), Zn−2, pkn−2) . . . , Z1, pk1) to U1, where Zi = (H,αi, ti, cumulative-penaltyi,
Ui+1), i ∈ [1, n−1], as defined in Procedure 2. U1 decrypts M0, gets Z1 and the next destination
(over here U2) to which the packet must be forwarded. Hence in the Locking Phase, each node Ui
receives the packet from Ui−1, checks the correctness of incoming and outgoing contract’s terms
and condition, locks funds αi with Ui+1, to be claimed contingent to some condition within a
time-period of ti.
Figure 9: HTLC-GP lock phase
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• Locking Phase: If U0 gets a valid request from Un, it will initiate the locking phase. Each node
Ui sends the terms and condition of off-chain contract to Ui+1, i ∈ [0, n−1]. As illustrated in Fig
9, the off-chain contract is defined as follows: ‘αi will be paid to Ui+1 provided it reveals x : H =
H(x) within a period of ti else Ui unlocks αi from the contract and Ui+1 pays γ.(Σij=1(αjtj) +
(α0 + ψ)t0) as griefing-penalty.’
If there is discrepancy in the terms of the outgoing contract, to be formed with Ui+1, and the
terms of the incoming contract request forwarded Ui−1, then Ui does not accept the incoming
off-chain contract. The receiver Un checks the following before accepting the contract from Un−1:
the amount it has to lock in the contract is approximately γ(φ(n).α)tn−1, the amount locked by
Un−1 is α and the expiration time of the contract differs at least by ∆. If any of the condition
is violated, it refrains from accepting the incoming contract request.
For any channel (Ui, Ui+1), if HTLC-GP gets established, the amount locked for a period of ti is
αi+γ.(Σ
i
j=1(αjtj)+(α0+ψ)t0), where αi comes from U
′
is deposit and γ.(Σ
i
j=1(αjtj)+(α0+ψ)t0)
comes from U ′i+1s deposit. We state the details of Locking Phase in Procedure 1, Procedure 2
and Procedure 3 for sender, other intermediate nodes and receiver respectively.
Procedure 1: Locking Phase for U0
1 Input: (tnow, ψ, α0, γ,H)
2 calculate cumulative-penalty0 = γ.(ψ + α0)t0
3 if α˜ ≤ remain(U0, U1) and remain(U1, U0) ≥ cumulative-penalty0 then
4 t0 = tnow + n∆
5 for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} do
6 tj = tj−1 −∆
7 αj = αj−1 − fee(Uj)
8 cumulative-penaltyj = cumulative-penaltyj−1 + γ.αjtj
9 end
10 Form the packet for onion routing M0 = E(. . . E(E(Zn−1, pkn−1), Zn−2, pkn−2) . . . , Z1, pk1),
where Zi = (H, αi, ti, cumulative-penaltyi, Ui+1), i ∈ [1, n− 1], E(, pk) denotes standard
encryption with public key pk.
11 Send Locking Phase(M0, U1, t0, cumulative-penalty0, α0, γ)
12 if acknowledgement received from U1 then
13 remain(U0, U1) = remain(U0, U1)− α0
14 remain(U1, U0) = remain(U0, U1)− cumulative-penalty0
15 Form HTLC −GP (H, t0, α0, cumulative-penalty0) with U1
16 Record tform0 = current clock time
17 end
18 else
19 abort
20 end
21 end
22 else
23 abort.
24 end
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Procedure 2: Locking Phase (for Ui, i ∈ [1, n− 1])
1 Input: (Mi−1, ti−1, cumulative-penaltyi−1, αi−1, γ)
2 Ui receives encrypted message Mi−1 from Ui−1, decrypts and receives Mi and
Zi = (H, αi, ti, cumulative-penaltyi, Ui+1).
3 if ti−1 ≥ ti + ∆ and αi−1 − fee(Ui) = αi and
cumulative-penaltyi − γαiti = cumulative-penaltyi−1 and remain(Ui, Ui+1) ≥ αi and
remain(Ui+1, Ui) ≥ cumulative-penaltyi then
4 Sends acknowledgement to Ui−1
5 Send Locking Phase(Mi, Ui+1, ti, cumulative-penaltyi, αi, γ) to Ui+1
6 if acknowledgement received from Ui+1 then
7 remain(Ui, Ui+1) = remain(Ui, Ui+1)− αi
8 remain(Ui+1, Ui) = remain(Ui, Ui+1)− cumulative-penaltyi
9 establish HTLC −GP (H, ti, αi, cumulative-penaltyi) with Ui+1
10 Record tformi = current clock time
11 end
12 else
13 abort
14 end
15 end
16 else
17 cancel(′time-elapsed′, Ui−1, Ui, current clock time− tformi−1 , ti−1)
18 abort.
19 end
Procedure 3: Locking Phase for Un
1 Input: (Mn−1, tn−1, cumulative-penaltyn−1, αn−1, γ)
2 Un receives encrypted message Mn−1 from Un−1, decrypts and receives Mn and
Zn = (H, α, φ, φ, φ).
3 if tn−1 ≥ ∆ and αn−1 = α and γ(φ(n)αn−1)tn−1 ≈ cumulative-penaltyn−1 then
4 Sends acknowledgement to Un−1
5 end
6 else
7 abort.
8 end
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• Release Phase: It is triggered by Un which upon receiving off-chain contract from Un−1, releases
the preimage to Un−1 and resolves the contract off-chain, as shown in Procedure 4. In case of
dispute, it goes on-chain for settling the contract. This is repeated for other parties Ui, i ∈
[1, n− 1], which upon obtaining the preimage claims payment from the counterparty.
If Ui+1 griefs and refuses to release preimage to Ui, it has to pay the a griefing-penalty for
affecting the nodes Uk, 0 ≤ k ≤ i, so that all the nodes obtain their due compensation. Note that
we make an assumption here that either the contracts are settled instantly or any of the node
must have griefed and caused delay in settlement.
With the locktime of off-chain contract between (Un−1, Un) set to tn−1 > ∆ and considering
a synchronous model of communication, ∆ is set as the threshold time for demanding griefing-
penalty from the counterparty while settling the contract off-chain, as shown in Procedure 5. In
other words, if any rational intermediate node finds that its counterparty comes with a request
of off-chain termination of HTLC-GP after elapse of ∆ unit of time, it serves as proof that some
party down the line had griefed and hence the delay. It will claim the full compensation from
the counterparty while terminating the contract off-chain.
Procedure 4: Release Phase for Ui, i ∈ [1, n]
1 Input: Ui,H, x
2 if H ?= H(x) then
3 if current clock time− tformi−1 < ti−1 then
4 if Ui releases x to Ui−1 then
5 if Ui and Ui−1 mutually agree to terminate HTLC GP then
6 terminate(Ui−1, Ui, 0, αi−1 + cumulative-penaltyi−1)
7 end
8 else
9 Ui goes on-chain for settlement by claiming (αi−1 + cumulative-penaltyi−1).
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 else
14 Ui−1 goes on-chain for settlement, claims (αi−1 + cumulative-penaltyi−1).
cancel(′time elapsed′, Ui−2, Ui−1, current clock time− tformi−2 , ti−2)
15 end
16 Call Release Phase(Ui−1,H, x)
17 end
18 else
19 cancel(′parameter mismatch error′, Ui−1, Ui, current clock time− tformi−1 , ti−1)
20 end
6.2 Security Analysis
Correctness of payment based on the commitment used for each off-chain contract is dependent on the
underlying one-way function being used. Over here, we consider the commitment used is a hash value
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Procedure 5: cancel
Input : error message,Ui, Uj , time-elapsed,locktime
1 if Uj 6= U0 then
2 if Ui and Uj mutually agree to terminate HTLC GP then
3 if time-elapsed ≥ ∆ then
4 grief-penalty = cumulative-penaltyi
5 end
6 else
7 grief-penalty = 0
8 end
9 terminate(Ui, Uj , grief-penalty + αi−1, cumulative-penaltyi − grief-penalty)
10 end
11 else
12 /*After elapse of locktime */
13 Ui goes on-chain for settlement, claims (αi + cumulative-penaltyi).
14 end
15 cancel(′time elapsed′, Ui−1, Ui, current clock time− tformi−1 , ti−1)
16 end
Procedure 6: terminate
1 Input: Ui, Uj , valueUi , valueUj
2 remain(Ui, Uj) = remain(Ui, Uj) + valueUi
3 remain(Uj , Ui) = remain(Ui, Ui) + valueUj
18
where payment can be claimed contingent to the knowledge of preimage. So the security of HTLC-GP
boils down to the fact: Hash functions are easy to compute but hard to invert. In Theorem 1, we
provide a proof of correctness to show that except griefer, none of the honest intermediate party loses
funds to pay a compensation to any other affected party. In Theorem 2, we proof that our proposed
payment protocol preserves privacy.
Theorem 1 Given a payment request (U0, Un, α0) to be transferred via path 〈U0, U1, . . . , Un〉, if a
party Uj , j ∈ [1, n] griefs then it is required to pay a penalty which is used for compensating all the
affected parties. Apart from the griefer, none of the honest parties lose funds in the process.
Proof Sketch: We consider the three possible cases:
• Rest of the parties being honest, receiver Un griefs: In the Pre-processing Phase, the sender
being honest, there is no deviation from the protocol.
In the Locking Phase, the receiver is the last node in the path and hence there is no scope
of griefing by refusing to forward HTLC-GP to its next neighbour. It can deny accepting an
incoming HTLC-GP from node Un−1, thereby forcing Un−1 to cancel HTLC-GP with Un−2 and
so on. As U0 to Un−1 are honest, all parties will prefer canceling the HTLC-GP and free up their
funds than hold on to the HTLC-GP to earn the griefing penalty.
In the Release Phase, the receiver can grief by either refusing to terminate the contract or
withholding the witness from Un−1. It will lock funds in the path for a period of tn−1 > tnow+∆.
As a consequence, it pays a cumulative penalty of γ((ψ + α0)t0 + Σ
n−1
j=1αjtj), where γαjtj is the
griefing-penalty charged by channel (Uj , Uj+1), j ∈ [1, n− 1] for keeping funds locked until time
tj and γ(ψ + α0)t0 is the griefing-penalty charged by channel (U0, U1). Except Un, every node
in the path earn the maximum compensation.
• Sender and receiver is honest, any intermediate party Ui, i ∈ [1, n−1] griefs: For the Pre-processing
Phase, the argument is similar to the previous case.
In the Locking Phase, Ui can grief by not forwarding the HTLC-GP to Ui+1. If it doesn’t cancel
the contract with Ui−1, it ends up paying a cumulative penalty of γ((ψ + α0)t0 + Σi−1j=1αjtj).
In the Release Phase, Ui can grief in the following ways:
– It refuses to terminate the contract or withholds the witness from Ui−1: Pays the same
penalty, as it would have incurred during a griefing attack in the Locking Phase.
– If Ui doesn’t respond to the request off-chain termination of contract, then Ui+1 will claim
its reward by revealing the preimage on-chain and closing the channel (Ui, Ui+1). Hence
reverse-griefing is not possible in this case.
• Rest of the parties being honest, sender U0 griefs: While executing the Pre-processing Phase,
if the sender sends malformed packets through the path, there can be two possibilities:
– Any intermediate parties figure out discrepancy in the terms of the contract.
– Receiver detects error in the parameters (insufficient locktime, wrong amount being trans-
ferred, incorrect payment hash) and doesn’t release the preimage.
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In either of the case, this would result in sending an error message to the preceding contracts and
request for its off-chain termination. All parties Uj , j ∈ [1, n] being honest immediately cancel
their contracts with Uj+1. U0 may reverse-grief and force U1 to pay penalty. But as stated,
mounting this attack does not fulfil any of the objectives of griefing attack. Even it had been the
case that U1 is the victim which it was trying to sabotage, it manages to block just a fraction
of funds deposited by U1 in the channel (U0, U1). It is not able to exhaust its channel or isolate
U1. Hence it would rather prefer to free up funds than keep it locked in the channel.
Corollary 1 If the adversary initiates a self payment and mounts a Griefing Attack, none of its
objectives are fulfilled.
Proof Sketch: As mentioned in Section 2, an adversary can conduct a self payment so that it can
either lock funds in a path for a substantial amount of time or eliminate a competitor in the network
by preventing it from processing any payment request. We argue that our design thwarts off such an
attack. We consider the two main motivations of such a self payment:
• Stalling network: If the adversary wants to stall a network, the strategy would be to create longer
paths between the sender and receiver so as to have maximum network coverage.
If the adversary corrupts the Pre-processing and Locking Phase, only the channel between
U0 and U1 contains unresolved contract for the timelocked period. This does not allow the
adversary to stall a large portion of the network because only one edge per path gets affected.
Hence, a rational adversary would choose to free up those funds and utilize them elsewhere than
get stuck in the unsuccessful Griefing Attack.
If the adversary corrupts the Release Phase, as shown in Theorem 1, the adversary needs to
pay the penalty for all the intermediaries in the path, making the attack uneconomic.
• Eliminating a competitor: To eliminate a competitor, the adversary has to block all outgoing
funds available to the victim node in its existing channels. The only economic attack where the
adversary will not lose fund for paying penalty is non acceptance of HTLC-GP in Locking Phase.
Rest of the nodes will cancel their off-chain contract formed with the counterparty. However,
U0 can reverse-grief by not responding to U1’s request. But as argued in Theorem 1, it has no
effect on the victim’s existing channel’s outgoing capacities, rendering the attack useless to the
adversary.
If the adversary withholds the witness in Release Phase then the objective of eliminating the
competitor is accomplished. It earns the extra processing fee by forcing future payment requests
to be routed through itself. However, this profit is earned at the cost of paying a griefing-penalty,
which is a multiple of the capacity of victim’s outgoing payment channels. Definitely the profit
margin reduces. If the penalty rate is set accordingly, the system ensures that the penalty
incurred exceed the profit earned and the purpose of the attack stands defeated.
Theorem 2 Given the information of griefing-penalty in the off-chain contract, an intermediate node
cannot infer its exact position in the path for routing payment.
Proof Sketch: For routing payment of amount α from U0 to Un via intermediaries Ui, i ∈ [1, n− 1],
several instances of off-chain contract is established across the payment channels. The amount locked
by party Uj and Uj+1 in their off-chain contract is αj and γ((ψ + α0)t0 + Σ
k=j
k=1αjtj), j ∈ [0, n − 1],
respectively. Let us assume that there exists an algorithm τ which reveals the exact position of any
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intermediate node D : D ∈ {U1, U2, . . . , Un−1} in the path. This implies that given the information of
cumulative griefing-penalty mentioned in the contract, it can distinguish between the penalty charged
by channel (Uj , Uj+1), j ∈ [1, n− 1] and penalty charged by channel (U0, U1), which is γ((ψ + α0)t0).
However, ψ was added by node U0 as an extra compensation charged to cover up for routing attempt
expense as well as hiding its identity from its next neighbour. This is information is private and
not known by any node except U0. Additionally, the value of ψ is set such that ψt0 ≥ α((k +
1)t0 + Σ
k
l=1l∆), k ∈ N. Any number being selected from N being equiprobable, the probability of
distinguishing becomes negligible.
Note: In practical application, there is a limit on the routing attempt fee which a sender can
charge. The set from which k is selected is significantly smaller compared to N. But even under such
circumstances, the best inference made by any intermediate node Uj about its location is that it is
located at position (j + k) where ψt0 > α.t0 + α.(t0 + ∆) + α.(t0 + 2∆) + . . .+ α.(t0 + k∆), k acts as
the blinding factor.
6.3 Discussions
Certain problems which has not been addressed by our proposed strategy:
• Other forms of griefing attack: We do not consider the case where a counterparty resolves
the contract just before the expiration of locktime. Imposing a penalty based on the amount
of elapsed time has been has been discussed in [25] as hold fee. However, in an asynchronous
system it is difficult to record the amount of elapsed time, since time interval may have different
meaning to different nodes in the network. For example, a malicious party manipulates the clock
so that time elapse slowly compared to other parties. Alternately, in a synchronous system even
though all nodes depend on a global clock, there is no way to judge who speaks the truth and
who is lying. It might be the case the party who has to pay a penalty tampers the information of
elapsed time and pays a lower penalty. No one can raise a dispute as Bitcoin script currently lacks
the capability of enabling execution of transaction for each time interval elapsed. The closest
match is the CheckSequenceVerify opcode. However this enables broadcast of a transaction after
a certain block height has been reached. But there is no way to execute transaction like this:
If t’ time units have elapsed, pay amount p. If t’+1 time units have elapsed, pay amount p+ δ.
CheckSequenceVerify imposed on the first condition of elapse of t’ time unit makes it eligible for
broadcasting event after elapse of time t’+1. Hence imposing penalty for milder form of griefing
has not been considered.
• Possibility of earning money by reverse-griefing: Here we consider that any malicious
party has the motive to grief to either eliminate a competitor or stall the network. As a side
effect of the proposed penalty mechanism, it is now possible for parties to reverse-grief and
victimize its counterparty. This problem is bound to occur when both the party has locked fund
in the contract, to be claimed by the other party upon deviation from the protocol. Both the
parties have a way of earning money, either acting honestly or dishonestly. We glance through
the possibilities by which a node can make money illegitimately:
– An adversarial sender tampers with the terms of the contract (sending less amount to
receiver, setting wrong timelock [26], etc.). Assuming rest of the parties to be honest,
contracts will be canceled, when termination is triggered by receiver. But the party which
has accepted contract from the adversary will suffer because now the latter stops responding.
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Off-chain termination of contract is possible if and only if two parties mutually agree. In
the event of non cooperation, the honest party is forced to pay penalty as per terms of the
contract. Plus there is no way to ascribe blame on the party who has reverse-griefed.
– If apart from sender and receiver, some other nodes in the path are corrupted as well,
then it is the best situation. Sender tampers with the terms of the contract. Receiver
terminates the contract off-chain. Some intermediate node reverse-grief by not responding
to the request of off-chain termination of contract. All the nodes preceding it suffer as
a result of locking of funds for substantial amount of time. The objective of stalling the
network is accomplished but at the cost of ascribing the blame on an honest node. So this
leads to a situation where even griefing attack results in monetary gain.
∗ An observation: Previously, the optimal choice was to select just one node which griefs
and locks funds in the entire path. With the introduction of griefing-penalty, in order
to avoid paying a compensation, at least two nodes in the path must be corrupted, as
per the argument made above.
– It is not easy to judge the course of action of any intermediate party carrying out the
payment. With a two options of making money, either follow protocol and earn a processing
fee or get a compensation for being griefed. Though we assume honest party will act
rationally, in reality a party is selfish and its strategy will be to formulate a dynamic course
of action which will result in maximum monetary gain, as per the situation. If a party finds
that its channel may not be utilized much in future and it won’t be earning a good amount
of processing fee, it will certainly wait for the situation where the counterparty comes with
a request of canceling the contract off-chain due to some discrepancy in the terms of the
contract. It can then reverse-grief and make a good amount of profit.
• Compensation withdrawn for off-chain termination of contract: As described in the
protocol, after elapse of ∆ time units, rest of the party withdraws the maximum compensation
i.e. an amount which it should receive had it been griefed for the entire locktime stated in the
contract. We avoid paying compensation based on the amount of time elapsed. Consider the
situation where A wants to pay money to E, via path AB, BC, CD and DE. Suppose AB has
a locktime of 4 days, BC has a locktime of 3 days, CD has a locktime of 2 days and DE has
a locktime of 1 day. If we consider a time-elapsed based penalty, then E will pay a cumulative
penalty incurred for locking funds of all the channel for 1 day, D will pay a cumulative penalty
incurred for locking funds in channel CD, BC and AB for 2 days, C pays a cumulative penalty
incurred for 3 days to party B and A, and B pays a penalty for locking funds for 4 days. If E
griefs, it pays a compensation to A, B, C and D at the rate of keeping funds locked for 1 day.
Now D asks C to terminate the contract off-chain, paying a compensation for 1 day. C might
start reverse-griefing, forcing D to pay compensation for keeping funds locked for 2 days. D will
lose out fund as it has to pay compensation for one extra day loss. Hence to prevent an honest
party from being victimized, we implement the following strategy: The first party to launch a
griefing attack in a path has to pay the maximum compensation for rest of the nodes preceding it.
• High Collateral at stake - A party accepting any incoming off-chain contract has to lock a
substantial amount as penalty. This can lead to a decrease in throughput because of the increase
in liquidity being tied up for each payment. However, the problem can be countered by adjusting
the value of γ. We infer that a staggered locktime across the path involved in transferring the
payment adds to the problem of collateral cost as well. As a countermeasure, we would like to
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propose a constant locktime payment protocol so that any griefer can affect at most one party by
refusing to accept any payment request. Rest of the parties can resolve the payment and won’t
be affected by an adversary who had griefed somewhere down the line.
7 Related Works
Impact of Griefing Attack
Griefing Attack in HTLCs was first mentioned in [27]. As countermeasure, it was proposed to split
big amounts into smaller packetized payments. However, the problem of griefing was correlated to the
trust in the counterparties. In off-chain payment, the word trust must be taken with a pinch of salt
since there is no way to predict behavior of participants. Later, it was shown in [20], how griefing
attack along with channel exhaustion can be potentially applied for eliminating specific edges and
paths in the payment channel network. It was possible to isolate a node by blocking the outgoing
channel by conducting self payment of value equivalent to the channel capacity. Hijacking of routes
by malicious nodes who abruptly drop their processing fee in order to attract several payments to
be routed through it has been discussed in [28]. Intermediary node intentionally goes offline and
sender waits for the HTLC to expire before making another attempt for payment. If such a node
has high centrality measure then it can potentially launch Denial-of-Service attack by stalling large
number of transactions. Repeated route selection via such malicious nodes will never allow payments
to succeed. Paralyzing the network for multiple days by overloading each channel with maximum
unresolved HTLCs has been studied in [29], [28]. The impact of the attack is quite disastrous as none
of the channel can accept new requests. Also, an adversary can form a payment channel with a hub
node and render it useless by blocking its channel capacity. Both the work shows that cost of the
attack is quite low compared to the impact and can be optimized as well. Similarly, [30] shows how
adversary can perform a balance lockdown in Lightning Network by conducting self payment in the
network. A follow up on this line of work, recently Bank run attacks on Bitcoin’s Lightning Network
was emperically analyzed in [18]. Here the adversary generates a number of sybil nodes, establishes
channels with existing nodes in the PCN. It then initiates several multi-hop payments between such
sybil nodes and griefs them simultaneously. It was observed just by targeting 1.5% of the highly
connected nodes in the network, approximately 83% of the network capacity can be locked for several
days.
Certain Countermeasures
Several ideas have been stated to prevent an honest node from becoming a victim of griefing attack.
A limit on the number of incoming channel as well as the channel capacity was proposed in [20]
as countermeasure for node isolation attack. However, the attacker may split the funds over multiple
identities and channels to bypass the restrictions imposed. Some game theoretic approach for analyzing
the strategies of attacker and defender was proposed in [28]. Faster resolution of HTLC has been stated
in [29] as another method to avoid the disadvantage of having staggered locktime across payment
channel. However, such a feature would violate the purpose of having HTLC timeout which acts as
safety net against other possible malicious activities. All these payment protocol had a staggered
locktime over each channel responsible for routing the payment. The collateral cost incurred for
staggered locktime protocols is substantial. Sprites [31], an ethereum styled payment network, first
proposed the idea of using constant locktime for resolving payment. However, privacy was violated
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as the path information, identity of sender and receiver was known by all participants involved in
routing the payment. Similar concept of reducing collateral cost using constant locktime contracts was
proposed for Bitcoin-compatible payment networks in [19]. However, it violated relationship anonymity
and the proposed protocol is yet to be realized practically.
Alternate mitigation strategies by incentivizing or punishing nodes have been stated in the past.
Use of up-front payment was first proposed in [32]. In up-front payment, a party has to pay fee to the
other party for accepting the HTLC. An excess fee paid is returned back to the sender upon successful
resolution of payment. This introduces a lot of economic barrier where up-front payment may exceed
the transaction fee. For small valued payment, a large up-front payment is a serious problem. Also,
any intermediate party may cheat and stop forwarding the HTLC to the next party. In the event of
failure, a sender incurs a loss as the malicious party will never refund the money. Later, in [33], [25],
the concept of reverse-bond was proposed which is similar to our proposed strategy. The counterparty
accepting the HTLC will have to pay a hold- fee on a per unit interval basis, as if it has rented the
HTLC. However, it has not been stated formally how this can be realized plus there is no way to
track per unit interval in a decentralized asynchronous setup. In [17], a proposal of Proof-of-Closure
of channels was proposed, where by each HTLC will have a hard timeout and a soft timeout period.
If in a channel, a counterparty crosses the limit of soft timeout in resolving the HTLC, then the party
which had forwarded the HTLC will drop the channel on-chain. Simultaneously, it will send a report
of closure of channel upstream. The node preceding it will not close its channel upon elapse of soft
timeout after receiving the report. It checks the validity of the report and notifies its predecessor in
turn. It was stated that closure of channel is the loss incurred by the node trying to grief. However,
a malicious node can setup several sybil nodes just for this purpose so that channel closure doesn’t
affect its normal activity in the network.
8 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a strategy for mitigating griefing attack in Bitcoin-compatible PCNs
by imposing penalty on the adversary. This increases the total cost for launching such an attack
as well as compensates other nodes in the network affected by griefing. We have shown how our
proposed strategy works in a timelocked payments by proposing a new protocol HTLC-GP. It can be
easily incorporated into the existing HTLC framework of Lightning Network [16]. As our next step,
we intend to provide a proof-of-concept implementation of HTLC-GP as well as do some empirical
analysis on the Lightning Network thereby justifying the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.
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